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TRANSFERRING LIFE INSURANCE
POLICIES FOR CONSIDERATION
— by Neil E. Harl*
In general, amounts received by a beneficiary as death
benefit proceeds under a life insurance contract are
excludable from the beneficiary's income.1  This is the
applicable rule where payment is made to the estate of the
insured or to a designated beneficiary and whether paid
directly or in trust.  Recently, regulations have been
proposed that would allow the payment of benefits prior to
death without income tax liability to the recipient if death is
expected to occur within 12 months.2
A greater concern is the income tax treatment of policy
proceeds where the life insurance is transferred not as a gift
but for value.
Transfer for value rule
If a life insurance policy is transferred for valuable
consideration, for value, the amount excludable from
income is limited to the consideration paid plus premiums
and other amounts paid subsequently by the transferee.3
Thus, a substantial part of the policy proceeds could be
subject to income tax.  There are, however, two exceptions
to this "transfer for value" rule —
•  If the transfer for value is to the insured, to a partner of
the insured, to a partnership in which the insured is a partner
or to a corporation in which the insured is a shareholder or
officer, the policy proceeds are not taxable as income to the
beneficiary.4  This is the "exempt persons" exception to the
transfer for value rule.
•  If the income tax basis of the policy is determined in
whole or in part by reference to the basis of the contract in
the hands of the transferor, the proceeds are not taxable as
income to the beneficiary.5  This is the "carryover basis"
exception to the transfer for value rule.
In general, once a policy is transferred for value, the
income exclusion available if there is a subsequent transfer
by gift is limited to the amount that could have been
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excluded by the transferor plus any premiums paid by the
recipient of the policy.6
Loan on policy
Transfers of life insurance policies by sale or exchange
are relatively rare so the transfer for value rule is only
infrequently invoked for such transfers.  What is more
common is the transfer of a policy encumbered by a policy
loan.  In some instances, transfers of that type could trigger
the transfer for value rule.  If the policy loan exceeds the
transferor's basis in the policy, the transferor could be taxed
(for income tax purposes) on the difference between the
basis and the outstanding loan at the time of the transfer.
An assumption by the transferee of the outstanding loan
on a policy may constitute valuable consideration given by
the transferee.7  Litigated cases have established that
valuable consideration is not limited to money or other
property.8  The result could be that the proceeds in excess of
the transferee's basis in the policy would be included in the
beneficiary's income.9
However, as noted above,10 if a transferee's basis is
determined in whole or in part by reference to the
transferor's basis, the transfer may come within the
carryover basis exception to the transfer for value rule.11
Thus, except where the transferor borrows on the cash value
an amount in excess of the income tax basis in the policy, a
transfer of a life insurance policy which is part gift-part
"sale" should not subject the policy proceeds to income
taxation.  The transfer should come within the carryover
basis exception to the transfer for value rule.12  In the event
the loan exceeds the cash value of the policy, a transfer of
the policy would seem not to come within the carryover
basis exception to the transfer for value rule and the
proceeds could be taxable to the policy beneficiary.
Certainly, care should be exercised in transfers of life
insurance policies where there is a loan on the policy.
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FOOTNOTES
1 I.R.C. § 101(a)(1).
2 Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.101-8, 1.7702-0, 1.7702-2,
1.7702A-1.
3 I.R.C. § 101(a)(2).
4 I.R.C. § 101(a)(2)(B).
5 I.R.C. § 101(a)(2)(A).
6 Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1(b)(2).
7 See Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1(b)(4).
8 See, e.g., Malone v. U.S., 326 F. Supp. 106 (D. Miss.
1971).
9 See I.R.C. § 101(a)(2).
10 See note 5 supra.
11 See Rev. Rul. 69-187, 1969-1 C.B. 45 (donee-transferee
paid loan); Ltr. Rul. 8027113, no date given (donee did
not pay loan).
12 See I.R.C. § 101(a)(2)(A).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
DISMISSAL. The debtor had originally filed a Chapter
12 bankruptcy case and a creditor had filed a motion for
relief from the automatic stay in that case. The debtor
discovered that the debtor was not eligible for Chapter 12
and voluntarily dismissed the Chapter 12 case and refiled
for Chapter 11. The creditor argued that Section 109(g)
prohibited the second filing within 180 days after a
voluntary dismissal of a case in which a motion for relief
from the automatic stay had been filed.  The court held that
Section 109(g) was not mandatory and that a second filing
would be allowed because the debtor did not dismiss the
first case and refile only to prevent the creditor from
obtaining relief from the automatic stay. Tooke v.
Sunshine Trust Mortgage Trust No. 86-225, 149 B.R.
687 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors claimed an
exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) for $4,235 of the
equity in their homestead. The debtors sought avoidance of
a $300,000 second lien against the homestead as impairing
their exemption. The court held that the lien could be
avoided only to the extent of the debtors’ claimed
exemption amount. The remaining portion of the lien was
held to be subordinate to the exemption amount after
conclusion of the bankruptcy case. In re Gonzalez, 149
B.R. 9 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993).
Twelve days before filing for bankruptcy the debtor
transferred homestead property to the debtor and the
debtor’s spouse as joint tenants. The debtor and spouse
filed a joint bankruptcy case and each claimed the Maine
$60,000 homestead exemption. The homestead was subject
to a mortgage in excess of the fair market value and to two
judgment liens. No objections to the exemption claims were
filed and the debtors sought to avoid the judgment liens as
impairing the homestead exemptions. The court held that
because the judgment liens attached to the homestead
before the transfer to the spouse, the spouse could not avoid
the judgment liens.  The court also held that the debtor
could not avoid the judgment liens because the debtor had
no equity in the homestead, even if the judgment liens were
avoided. In re Saturley, 149 B.R. 245 (Bankr. D. Me.
1993).
HOMESTEAD. When a creditor attempted to levy on
real property owned by the debtor, the debtor claimed the
property eligible for a homestead exemption. The state
court denied the debtor’s claim and the creditor sought a
sale of the property. The sale was prevented by the debtor’s
bankruptcy filing, in which the debtor again claimed the
property as an exempt homestead. The creditor failed to
timely object to the exemption but objected when the debtor
sought an avoidance of the lien as impairing the exemption.
The court held that the failure to timely object to the
exemption prohibited any denial of the exemption;
however, the court also ruled that the failure to object to the
exemption did not prevent the denial of the exemption for
purposes of lien avoidance. The court also held that the
Bankruptcy Court’s denial of the avoidance because of
giving full faith and credit to the state court denial of the
exemption was improper because the debtor’s eligibility for
the exemption had to be determined as of the date of the
petition and the facts and circumstances could have
changed between the state court ruling and the filing of the
petition.  In re Morgan, 149 B.R. 147 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1993).
Under a divorce settlement, the debtor had received
money for the debtor’s interest in the marital homestead in
Michigan.  The debtor moved to Kansas and filed for
bankruptcy, claiming the money as exempt proceeds from
the sale of a homestead. The court held that because the
debtor would not have been allowed a Kansas exemption
for a Michigan homestead, the debtor could not claim a
homestead exemption from the proceeds of a Michigan
homestead. In re Sipka, 149 B.R. 181 (D. Kan. 1992).
The debtor had executed a deed of trust encumbering
the debtor’s rural homestead and had signed a waiver
asserting that the property was not the debtor’s homestead
although the property was the debtor’s residence at that
time and when the bankruptcy petition was filed.  The
secured creditor objected to the debtor’s homestead
